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CONFUSION DEMANDS CLARITY: A SHORT, 
COMPLICATED HISTORY OF CONTRACT-
BASED FRAUD CLAIMS IN NORTH 
CAROLINA* 
INTRODUCTION 
In a contract, an integration clause or waiver of reliance indicates 
the parties agree that the contract represents their complete 
agreement.1 Thus, contradictory information from outside of the 
contract typically cannot be used to determine the scope of the 
parties’ agreement.2 In North Carolina, the courts have provided 
unclear guidance on whether integration clauses can completely 
preclude fraud claims based on representations made outside of the 
contract. Even when contracts are fully integrated and the parties 
explicitly agree that neither of them is relying on representations 
made outside of that contract, North Carolina courts have differed 
when deciding whether or not to allow extra-contractual 
representations to serve as the basis for fraud claims. 
This Recent Development is centered on two North Carolina 
Business Court cases: Wedderburn Corp. v. Jetcraft Corp.3 and Vestlyn 
BMP, LLC v. Balsam Mt. Group, LLC.4 Both opinions involved a 
motion to dismiss a fraud claim, but they differed in their treatment of 
extra-contractual statements. The Wedderburn court did not allow 
extra-contractual representations to serve as the basis for a fraud 
claim, while the Vestlyn court did allow extra-contractual statements 
to serve as the basis for a fraud claim. 
The differing conclusions in Wedderburn and Vestlyn appear to 
arise from two seemingly distinct ideologies that the North Carolina 
Business Court applied in the decisions. In Wedderburn, the court 
followed a lineage of cases that gives integration clauses more power 
to defend against fraud claims based on statements made outside of 
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 1. See 14A STRONG’S N.C. INDEX 4th, Evidence and Witnesses § 1896 (2017). 
 2. See id. 
 3. No. 15 CVS 757, 2015 WL 6951549 (N.C. Business Ct. Nov. 6, 2015) 
(unpublished). 
 4. No. 15 CVS 386, 2016 WL 3883652 (N.C. Business Ct. June 22, 2016) 
(unpublished). 
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the contract. In Vestlyn, the court followed a lineage of cases that 
allows parol evidence, or evidence outside of a contract, to support a 
fraud claim. 
The reason for the North Carolina Business Court’s differing 
conclusions in Wedderburn and Vestlyn is unclear. In Vestlyn, the 
court explained its decision to choose the standard from one lineage 
over the other as being based on the procedural stage in which the 
case was decided.5 However, because both Vestlyn and Wedderburn 
were rulings on motions to dismiss, this reasoning does not fully 
explain the differing outcomes. Because there is no clear distinction 
between these cases, it is unclear what the standard is for determining 
whether an integration clause will be held to preclude extra-
contractual evidence. This uncertainty creates significant problems 
for contract drafters, and the creation of a new standard may be 
required to remedy the issue. 
Analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the two 
lineages that led to the North Carolina Business Court’s differing 
rulings in Wedderburn and Vestlyn. Part II analyzes the problem that 
the differing opinions in Wedderburn and Vestlyn present to North 
Carolina courts. Part III offers potential solutions to this problem, 
including a factor test for courts to use when evaluating written 
agreements, as well as actions that can be taken by the legislature to 
offer drafters more certainty regarding the effectiveness of waivers of 
reliance on extra-contractual representations. 
I.  DIFFERING LINEAGES 
The first lineage that will be discussed is the Wedderburn lineage. 
This line of cases illustrates North Carolina courts’ enforcement of 
express waivers of reliance on extra-contractual statements at varying 
stages of litigation. Within this lineage, the courts have considered 
written contracts to be the parties’ complete agreement and refused 
to allow fraud claims based on evidence outside of the contract to 
proceed. The second line of cases, the Vestlyn lineage, represents 
North Carolina courts taking the opposite approach when ruling on 
motions to dismiss. In this lineage, the courts have held that 
integration clauses cannot serve as complete defenses to fraud claims, 
and that evidence outside of the contract can be used as the basis for 
a fraud claim. 
 
 5. See id. at *8. 
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A. The Wedderburn Lineage 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals laid the foundation for the 
Wedderburn decision in 1992 when it decided Ace Inc. v. Maynard.6 In 
Ace, the parties entered into a contract for Plaintiff to purchase an 
airplane.7 Prior to the completion of the sale, Defendant required that 
Plaintiff sign a one-page purchase agreement that contained the 
following statement: 
[p]urchasers [Ace, Incorporated] have been informed and 
understand that this is a final sale, and that the aircraft, parts 
and accessories, are being sold “AS IS” and “WHERE IS,” and 
that there are “NO REPRESENTATIONS OR 
WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED AS TO ANY 
MATTER WHATSOEVER, INCLUDING, WITHOUT [sic] 
LIMITATION, THE CONDITION OF THE AIRCRAFT, 
PARTS OR ACCESSORIES, ITS MERCHANTABILITY 
OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE.”8 
Shortly after signing the agreement and taking possession of the 
plane, Plaintiff discovered several defects with the aircraft.9 
Defendants refused to fix the defects, leaving Plaintiff to pay for the 
repairs himself.10 As a result, Plaintiff brought a claim for fraud, 
alleging that Defendants sold the aircraft with knowledge that it 
possessed these defects.11 At trial, the court granted Defendants’ 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), and 
Plaintiff appealed.12 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s 
grant of the motion for JNOV.13 The court’s analysis focused on two 
issues: (1) the express language of the written agreement, and (2) the 
evidentiary foundation of the fraud claim.14 The court’s opinion 
contained the following language: “because [Plaintiff] effectively 
agreed when he signed the Purchase Agreement that [D]efendants 
made no representations whatsoever with regard to the plane, 
[P]laintiff is unable to establish the making of a false 
 
 6. 108 N.C. App. 241, 423 S.E.2d 504 (1992). 
 7. Id. at 242, 423 S.E.2d at 505. 
 8. Id. at 244, 423 S.E.2d at 506 (alterations in original) (bold added). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 245, 423 S.E.2d at 507. 
 13. Id. at 250, 423 S.E.2d at 510. 
 14. Id. at 249–50, 423 S.E.2d at 509–10. 
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representation.”15 This language suggests an enforcement of the non-
reliance provision that Plaintiff signed prior to taking possession of 
the plane.16 Because this was a ruling on a JNOV motion, the court 
had at its disposal all of the evidence that had been gathered for the 
case, including statements made outside of the contract. Still, the 
court enforced the contract’s integration clause and held that the 
clause prevented Defendant from making a claim based on extra-
contractual statements. 
The cases following Ace were decided at progressively earlier 
stages of litigation where evidence is less available and thus less 
impactful in the courts’ decision-making. While each case in this 
lineage tracks the foundational language of Ace, they show a steady 
procedural shift further away from the trial stage, ultimately to the 
motion to dismiss stage. Still, the courts consistently applied the 
ruling from Ace that integration clauses preclude parties from 
bringing fraud claims based on evidence outside of the contract. The 
first case to begin this progression occurred in 2003 when the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals decided Chleborowicz v. Johnson.17 
In Chleborowicz, Defendant sold his boat to Plaintiff and the 
parties entered into a written agreement.18 The agreement contained 
the following language: “THIS VESSEL IS SOLD AS IS, WHERE 
IS, FREE AND CLEAR OF ALL LIENS AND 
INDEBTEDNESS[.]”19 The agreement also stated, “Hull indicated 
damage is not structural [and] is repaired to buyer’s satisfaction.”20 
Seven months after the purchase of the boat, Plaintiff discovered “a 
 
 15. Id. at 249–50, 423 S.E.2d at 510 (emphasis in original). This language has been 
cited multiple times by other North Carolina courts. See, e.g., Jackson v. Tim Maguire, 
Inc., 226 N.C. App. 583, 741 S.E.2d 514 (2013) (unpublished table decision), 2013 WL 
1616031, at *5; Chleborowicz v. Johnson, 160 N.C. App. 250, 584 S.E.2d 108 (2003) 
(unpublished table decision), 2003 WL 21961386, at *3; Wedderburn Corp. v. Jetcraft 
Corp., No. 15 CVS 757, 2015 WL 6951549, at *5 (N.C. Business Ct. Nov. 6, 2015) 
(unpublished). 
 16. While the court appears to dismiss the fraud claim because the integration clause 
precludes evidence from outside of the contract, the court also stated that even 
considering the extra-contractual evidence, Plaintiff did not prove the elements of fraud. 
Ace Inc., 108 N.C. App. at 249–50, 423 S.E.2d at 510 (“Moreover, plaintiff failed to 
establish concealment of a material fact on the part of defendants because plaintiff 
presented no evidence that defendants knew of any defects in the plane.”) As a result, it is 
unclear from the court’s consideration of both the integration clause and the extra-
contractual evidence whether the integration clause was enough to dismiss the fraud claim 
on its own. 
 17. 160 N.C. App. 250, 584 S.E.2d 108 (Aug. 18, 2003) (unpublished table decision), 
2003 WL 21961386. 
 18. Id. at *1. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at *3 (alterations in original). 
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catastrophic failure of the underwater section of the hull” that ended 
up costing Plaintiff more than $18,000.21 Plaintiff brought a claim for 
fraud. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment, and Plaintiff appealed.22 The North Carolina Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the fraud claim.23 
In its opinion, the court extensively discussed Ace and noted that 
the contract language in the two cases was similar.24 Using Ace as a 
guide, the court viewed the integration clause in the contract along 
with the lack of extra-contractual evidence that the Defendant made 
any fraudulent statements.25 As in Ace, the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the fraud claims.26 
Thus, this shows the court applying the standards from Ace, which 
was a ruling on a motion for JNOV, to a case on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
In Wedderburn, the North Carolina Business Court further 
expanded this lineage of case law and applied the rule that extra-
contractual evidence cannot serve as the basis of a fraud claim to a 
case in the motion to dismiss stage. Wedderburn involved the sale of 
an aircraft.27 The parties entered into an Aircraft Purchase 
Agreement (the “APA”) that contained a disclaimer stating that the 
aircraft “was being sold ‘as is, where is, with all faults,’ disclaiming 
any warranties, and waiving Seller’s liability for loss of business, lost 
profit, or other consequential and special damages.”28 Upon 
Defendant’s delivery of the aircraft to Plaintiff, the two parties 
executed an Aircraft Delivery Receipt (the “Receipt”).29 The Receipt 
contained a disclaimer that read: 
Purchaser hereby acknowledges that the Aircraft satisfies all of 
the requirements, terms and conditions of the [APA]. By 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at *1. 
 23. Id. at *5. 
 24. Id. at *3. 
 25. See id. In its analysis, the court both acknowledged the integration clause in the 
contract and stated that there was no extra-contractual evidence that Defendant 
committed fraud. Id. Even though the court dismissed the fraud claim, its discussion of the 
extra-contractual evidence proving fraud makes it unclear whether the dismissal of the 
fraud claim was entirely because of the integration clause. Thus, under Chleborowicz it is 
unclear whether a waiver of reliance clause is enough on its own to dismiss a fraud claim 
based on extra-contractual statements. 
 26. Id. at *5. 
 27. Wedderburn Corp. v. Jetcraft Corp., No. 15 CVS 757, 2015 WL 6951549, at *1 
(N.C. Business. Ct. Nov. 6, 2015) (unpublished). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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reason of the execution and delivery by Purchaser of this 
Aircraft Delivery Receipt, it is conclusively presumed that (i) 
Purchaser has approved and accepted the Aircraft and the 
Aircraft Documents . . . “As Is, Where is” in its then current 
technical condition and state of repair, with all faults, 
limitations and defects (whether hidden or apparent), 
regardless of cause; and (ii) except for Seller’s warranty of title 
to the Aircraft contained in the [APA] and Warranty Bill of 
Sale, Seller has not made with respect to the condition of the 
Aircraft any representation, warranty or guaranty of any kind, 
express or implied, whether arising in, law, in equity, in 
contract, or in tort, including, without limitation, any implied 
warranty of merchantability, airworthiness, design, condition, 
or fitness for a particular use.30 
Over the next few months, the corrections to the aircraft took 
longer than expected.31 Plaintiff filed a fraud claim, alleging that 
Defendant had knowingly made false statements as to the status of 
the aircraft.32 Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint.33 
The North Carolina Business Court granted Defendant’s motion 
to dismiss on Plaintiff’s fraud claim.34 Citing to Chleborowicz and 
Jackson v. Tim Maguire, Inc.,35 the court applied the analysis from 
Ace and viewed the express language of the written agreement as 
dispositive of the fraud claim.36 The following part of the opinion 
illustrates this analysis: 
After Defendant made the representations, Plaintiff signed the 
Delivery Receipt and took delivery of the Aircraft. These 
representations, made prior to Plaintiff’s execution of the 
disclaimer contained in the Delivery Receipt in which Plaintiff 
expressly acknowledged and agreed that Defendants had ‘not 
made . . . any representation’, cannot support claims for fraud 
or negligent misrepresentation.37 
 
 30. Id. at *2 (alterations in original) (emphasis added). 
 31. Id. at *3. 
 32. Id. at *9. 
 33. Id. at *1. 
 34. Id. at *12. 
 35. 226 N.C. App. 583, 741 S.E.2d 514 (Apr. 16, 2013) (unpublished table decision), 
2013 WL 1616031. Jackson also explicitly applies the standard from Ace to dismiss a fraud 
claim at the summary judgment stage. Id. at *5. 
 36. Wedderburn Corp., 2015 WL 6951549, at *9. 
 37. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Jackson, 2013 WL 1616031, at *3–5; Chleborowicz v. 
Johnson, 160 N.C. App. 250, 584 S.E.2d 108 (2003) (unpublished table decision), 2003 WL 
21961386, at *3–4).  
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Based on the court’s language, Wedderburn appears to extend 
the Ace analysis to cases at the motion to dismiss stage, even though 
the evidentiary standards at the motion to dismiss stage are 
significantly different from the JNOV stage under which Ace was 
decided. In North Carolina, a court deciding a motion to dismiss may 
only consider the evidence of allegations contained within the 
pleadings.38 Once a court begins to consider evidence outside of this 
scope, “the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and 
disposed of as provided in Rule 56.”39 Under these rules, at the 
motion to dismiss stage as in Wedderburn, the only pieces of evidence 
that the North Carolina Business Court had to consider were the 
allegations contained in the pleadings and likely the actual written 
agreement itself. Had the case proceeded to the summary judgment 
or JNOV stages, the court would have been able to look outside of 
the pleadings and consider “depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits.”40 Wedderburn 
occurred at the opposite end of the procedural spectrum as Ace and 
Chleborowicz, and therefore the court was not entitled to consider 
evidence from discovery as the courts could in the earlier cases. Still, 
the court chose to apply the same standard from Ace and hold that 
waivers of reliance can effectively bar fraud claims based on extra-
contractual statements. 
B. The Vestlyn Lineage 
The Vestlyn lineage illustrates North Carolina courts taking an 
opposite approach to express disclaimers and refusing to allow these 
contractual provisions to serve as complete defenses to fraud claims. 
Adhering to a much different approach than the Wedderburn lineage, 
the following line of case law appears conflicting and irreconcilable 
with the Wedderburn lineage. 
The case law supporting Vestlyn is based upon the rule that parol 
evidence will be admitted to form the basis of a fraud claim.41 In 
 
 38. See Weaver v. St. Joseph of the Pines, Inc., 187 N.C. App. 198, 203–04, 652 S.E.2d 
701, 707 (2007) (interpreting N.C. R. CIV. P. 12(b)). 
 39. N.C. R. CIV. P. 12(b). 
 40. N.C. R. CIV. P. 56. The gap between what is contained in the pleadings and what is 
ascertainable through discovery raises questions as to whether courts should apply Ace at 
the motion to dismiss stage. As was stated above, the court’s discussion of extrinsic 
evidence of fraud in Chleborowicz makes the significance of evidence unclear, thus raising 
questions as to the applicability of Ace at the motion to dismiss stage. See supra note 25. 
 41. See Fox v. S. Appliances, Inc., 264 N.C. 267, 270, 141 S.E.2d 522, 525 (1965) (citing 
Anderson Cotton Mills v. Royal Mfg. Co., 218 N.C. 560, 11 S.E.2d 550 (1940); Hardware 
Co. v. Kinion, 191 N.C. 218, 131 S.E. 579 (1926); Miller v. Howell, 184 N.C. 119, 113 S.E. 
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Vestlyn, the North Carolina Business Court had the following 
precedent at its disposal: 
Where there is a claim for fraud in the inducement, defenses 
based upon the fraudulently induced contract will not bar the 
claim. . . . [P]arol evidence could be introduced in 
contravention of an integration clause in a contract, where 
there was fraud in the inducement, which ‘vitiates the 
contract.’42 
Thus, unlike the Wedderburn lineage, the Vestlyn line of cases uses a 
standard that rejects the notion that waivers of reliance can serve as a 
complete defense to fraud claims. Instead, the rule followed in the 
Vestlyn lineage explicitly states that courts will consider extra-
contractual evidence in spite of contractual defenses, such as waivers 
of reliance. 
Vestlyn involved the sale of real property between two 
corporations.43 The Sales Purchase Agreement (the “SPA”) involved 
the sale of Plaintiffs’ interest in any land located in Jackson County, 
North Carolina.44 The SPA provided Defendants with a due diligence 
period of 44 days that would allow Defendants to inspect the property 
as well as terminate the SPA at any point during that period.45 
Defendants also agreed that it “ha[d] examined and underst[ood] the 
operation and/or condition of the Property” and “ ‘ha[d] made such 
examination of the operation, income and expenses of the Property, 
as well as other matters and documents affecting or relating to this 
transaction’ as it ‘deemed necessary.’ ”46 The SPA also contained an 
integration clause that said the parties were only bound by the 
provisions in the SPA and not by any statements made outside of the 
contract.47 
 
621 (1922); White Sewing Mach. Co. v. Bullock, 161 N.C. 1, 76 S.E. 634 (1912); Unitype 
Co. v. Ashcraft Bros., 155 N.C. 63, 71 S.E. 61 (1911)); see also 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and 
Deceit § 468, Westlaw (database updated May 2017). 
 42. Tradewinds Airlines, Inc. v. C-S Aviation Servs., 222 N.C. App. 834, 842, 733 
S.E.2d 162, 169–70 (2012) (citing Laundry Mach. Co. v. Skinner, 225 N.C. 285, 288–89, 34 
S.E.2d 190, 192–93 (1945)). 
 43. Vestlyn BMP, LLC v. Balsam Mountain Grp., LLC, No. 15 CVS 386, 2016 WL 
3883652, at *2 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 22, 2016) (unpublished).  
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. (citations omitted). 
 47. Id. (“Seller shall not be bound in any manner whatsoever by any guarantees, 
promises, projections, or other information . . . whether verbally or in writing, except as 
expressly set forth in this Agreement.”) 
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Following the transaction, Plaintiffs brought a breach of contract 
claim against the Defendants.48 In response, Defendants filed a 
counter-claim alleging that Plaintiffs made false extra-contractual 
representations as to their ability to redevelop the land included in 
the SPA into single or multi-family use.49 Plaintiffs, instead of arguing 
that Defendant did not sufficiently allege fraud, simply contented that 
the integration clause barred any reliance on representations made 
outside the SPA.50 Defendants alleged that “circumstances 
surrounding the transaction ‘induced [Defendant] to forego 
additional investigation’ of the misrepresentation,” and so they were 
entitled to rely on Plaintiffs’ representations outside of the SPA.51 
 The court held that the disclaimers in the SPA did not serve as 
complete defenses to the fraud claim.52 Instead, the court applied the 
standard from the Vestlyn lineage and allowed evidence outside of the 
contract to be used as the basis for a fraud claim.53 The Vestlyn court 
distinguished the case from the Wedderburn lineage by arguing that 
Ace and Chleborowicz took place at later stages of litigation than the 
motion to dismiss stage, and that the consideration of evidence at 
these stages required a different standard to be used for evaluating 
extra-contractual evidence than in 12(b)(6) proceedings.54 However, 
in distinguishing itself from Ace and the cases that followed in that 
lineage, the court did not discuss Wedderburn.55 The failure to discuss 
Wedderburn makes the court’s distinction between the Wedderburn 
and Vestlyn lineages unclear. Both cases were decided at the motion 
to dismiss stage. If, as the court explained in Vestlyn, the rule for 
determining which of the two lineages applies is based on the 
procedural stage, then Wedderburn and Vestlyn should have been 
decided in the same manner. Instead, Wedderburn and Vestlyn were 
decided in the same procedural stage, but the court applied different 
lineages and had opposite findings regarding the effectiveness of 
waivers of reliance. As a result, the distinction between the two 
lineages that is drawn by the court in Vestlyn, taken in consideration 
 
 48. Id. at *1. 
 49. Id. at *6. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. (alteration in original). 
 52. Id. at *7–8 (citing Fox v. S. Appliances, Inc., 264 N.C. 267, 270, 141 S.E.2d 522, 525 
(1965); Tradewinds Airlines, Inc. v. C-S Aviation Servs., 222 N.C. App. 834, 842–45, 733 
S.E.2d 162, 169–71 (2012); Parker v. Bennett, 32 N.C. App. 46, 50, 231 S.E.2d 10, 13 
(1977)). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at *8 
 55. Id. (distinguishing the case from cases within the Wedderburn lineage but not 
discussing Wedderburn). 
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with the differing rulings in Vestlyn and Wedderburn, demonstrates 
the seeming incompatibility of the two lineages. 
II.  THE PROBLEM THESE LINEAGES HAVE CREATED 
The North Carolina Business Court was created in part to 
“establish a body of case law to serve as guidance on business issues 
to the business community.”56 This goal allows North Carolina to 
develop a better business culture,57 much like what Delaware 
accomplished through the establishment of its Court of Chancery. 
The current incompatibility of the Wedderburn lineage and the 
Vestlyn lineage does not serve that goal. 
The two lines of cases appear irreconcilable for courts that are 
handling fraud claims at the motion to dismiss stage in cases where 
there is a written agreement that contains an express waiver of 
reliance on extra-contractual provisions. Because the Vestlyn court 
distinguishes itself from Ace on procedural grounds, whereas 
Wedderburn was decided in the same procedural stage and did apply 
the standard from Ace, it is unclear when each lineage applies. The 
opposite rulings in these two cases force North Carolina courts 
deciding cases at the motion to dismiss stage to choose between the 
two seemingly contradictory standards with no guidance for which 
standard is correct.58 Because there is no explanation for the differing 
rulings, North Carolina courts are left with two incompatible lines of 
cases. 
The conflict between Vestlyn and Wedderburn presents an 
obvious issue for businesses and contract drafters in determining how 
to protect themselves from litigation. On one hand, Wedderburn 
dictates that as long as an agreement contains the proper disclaimer, 
defendants should not worry about the prospect of discovery or trial 
because fraud claims will likely be dismissed at the motion to dismiss 
 
 56. Carrie A. O’Brien, Note, The North Carolina Business Court: North Carolina’s 
Special Superior Court for Complex Business Cases, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 367, 376 (2002) 
(citing Interview with Judge Ben Tennille, Special Superior Court Judge for Complex 
Business Cases, in Greensboro, N.C. (Jan. 14, 2001)). 
 57. Id. at 374–75. 
 58. Although there are factual differences between the two cases, Vestlyn does not 
explain how a court might interpret an integration clause differently based on the 
underlying facts of a case. For example, there is nothing to indicate the non-reliance 
provision was enforced differently in Vestlyn because Vestlyn involved a real estate 
transaction while Wedderburn involved a personal property transaction. See Vestlyn, 2016 
WL 3883652, at *7–8. 
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stage.59 However, Vestlyn holds the opposite—that no matter what 
kind of waiver is contained within an agreement, it will be vitiated at 
the motion to dismiss phase by mere allegations of fraud, and all of 
the extra-contractual statements that the parties agreed to keep out 
will be allowed in as evidence, following an expensive discovery 
process.60 Rather than attempt to decide which one of these opposing 
approaches may be better, North Carolina should not follow either 
line of cases. Instead, the courts and legislature should explore 
alternative solutions. 
III.  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
The creation and execution of agreements must be a process in 
which parties have a clear understanding of how they can protect 
themselves from lawsuits. Without that clarity, businesses in North 
Carolina will be open to lawsuits they agreed to preclude. There are 
multiple alternatives to the current standards that could provide this 
certainty. One potential solution is to allow courts to weigh factors 
when determining the enforceability of an integration clause. 
Alternatively, the legislature could develop contractual provisions 
that—when placed into certain written agreements—could be utilized 
as complete defenses to fraud claims. A similar alternative would be 
allowing the legislature to create specific rules or templates for how 
parties can write enforceable integration clauses into their contracts. 
Overall, any of these alternatives would be preferable to the current 
standard, where parties to a contract are forced to guess what lineage 
of case law a court will choose to apply when interpreting their 
contract. 
A. Factor Tests 
Disclaimers in contracts need to be given force in certain 
situations. Other jurisdictions have grappled with this contention 
when handling fraud claims. The Court of Appeals of New York aptly 
summarized this issue when it stated: 
If the language here used is not sufficient to estop a party from 
claiming that he entered the contract because of fraudulent 
representations, then no language can accomplish that purpose. 
To hold otherwise would be to say that it is impossible for two 
businessmen dealing at arm’s length to agree that the buyer is 
 
 59. See Wedderburn Corp. v. Jetcraft Corp., No. 15 CVS 757, 2015 WL 6951549, at *9 
(N.C. Business Ct. Nov. 6, 2015) (unpublished). 
 60. See Vestlyn, 2016 WL 3883652, at *7–8. 
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not buying in reliance on any representations of the seller as to 
a particular fact.61 
Contractual provisions like integration clauses will be rendered 
meaningless if they cannot prevent the very thing that they are 
constructed to protect against. There is also an irony to the idea that 
disclaimers cannot afford a defense to fraud claims. If a purchaser 
signs an agreement confirming that he did not rely on representations 
outside of the agreement, then he is “perpetrating [his] own fraud” by 
bringing the fraud claim.62 However, that is not to say that a court 
must apply the standard from the Wedderburn lineage in all scenarios. 
For example, in basic consumer contracts where the consumer is 
generally vastly less sophisticated than the seller of the product, it 
would be against the public’s interest to always bind the consumer to 
the boilerplate language of a contract’s integration clause if the 
contract was procured by fraud.63 In order to avoid these issues, other 
jurisdictions have held that rather than always enforcing or always 
ignoring disclaimers, the best approach may be to consider several 
factors surrounding the agreement before making the decision to 
enforce or ignore specific terms.64 
In Barr v. Dyke,65 the Supreme Court of Maine developed a 
factor test that allows the court to evaluate the circumstances that 
give rise to the alleged fraudulently induced agreement.66 The court 
listed the following factors as necessary considerations when deciding 
upon the enforceability of disclaimers: 
 
 61. Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597, 600 (N.Y. 1959). 
 62. Andrew M. Zeitlin & Alison P. Baker, At Liberty to Lie? The Viability of Fraud 
Claims after Disclaiming Reliance, ABA, BUS. TORTS LITIG. COMM., (Spring 2013), 
http://www.shipmangoodwin.com/files/21504_BUS_Article_Reprint.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8XU3-TFNB] (citing Danann Realty Corp., 157 N.E.2d at 600). 
 63. Delaware courts, for example, have already recognized that there is a need to 
distinguish between sophisticated and unsophisticated parties when determining whether 
to enforce a waiver of reliance. Progressive Int'l Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 
2002 WL 1558382, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 9, 2002) (stating that there is a greater presumption 
to bind parties by contractual terms if the parties are sophisticated). 
 64. See Barr v. Dyke, 2012 ME 108, ¶ 27, 49 A.3d 1280, 1289–90 (Me. 2012) 
(establishing six factors to consider when determining the enforceability of disclaimers 
when allegations of fraud exist); Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. América Móvil, 
S.A.B. de C.V., 952 N.E.2d 995, 1001–02 (N.Y. 2011) (analyzing through a fact-based 
approach and applying factors such as sophistication of parties); Forest Oil Corp. v. 
McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51, 60 (Tex. 2008) (clarifying which factors are to determine whether 
a disclaimer is enforceable). 
 65. 2012 ME 108, 49 A.3d 1280 (Me. 2012). 
 66. 2012 ME 108, ¶ 27, 49 A.3d at 1289. 
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(1) Whether the complaining party was advised by counsel; (2) 
Whether the terms of the agreement were negotiated and not 
boilerplate; (3) Whether the transaction was an arm’s-length 
transaction; (4) Whether the parties were knowledgeable in 
business matters; (5) Whether the language of the clause was 
clear; and (6) Whether, if litigation was against a fiduciary, the 
adversarial relationship of the parties demonstrated an absence 
of trust between the parties that negated any claim of 
reasonable reliance. 67 
These factors allow courts to evaluate agreements with a more 
nuanced approach. For example, the presence of counsel speaks to 
whether or not the playing field is level. Without counsel, a party may 
not be operating with a full understanding of the transaction.68 
Whether or not the contractual provisions were negotiated or 
boilerplate is important to consider because it arguably reflects a 
clearer intent of the parties.69 Factors three, four, and five of the Barr 
test all speak to the relationship of the parties and the ability of each 
to understand the ins and outs of the transaction.70 While these 
factors taken together might not be wholly representative of all the 
considerations that should be made in North Carolina courts, they do 
demonstrate an efficient list of things to consider when evaluating 
whether or not to enforce the contract exactly as it appears in writing. 
In Barr, the Supreme Court of Maine provides an example of the 
test being used while evaluating the enforceability of a waiver of 
reliance clause.71 In Barr, Plaintiffs were minority stockholders in a 
company that brought legal action against Defendants, the company’s 
directors, for breach of fiduciary duty.72 The parties resolved this 
dispute by reaching an agreement for Plaintiffs to sell their shares.73 
This agreement contained a provision stating that Plaintiffs had 
independently conducted a valuation of the company and that 
Plaintiffs had not relied on any representations made by Defendants 
when conducting this assessment.74 Plaintiffs later filed a complaint 
against Defendants, alleging that they had been fraudulently induced 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A., 952 N.E.2d at 1001–02. 
 69. See Forest Oil Corp., 268 S.W.3d at 60 (referring to negotiated terms as something 
that the parties specifically discussed during negotiations). 
 70. See Barr, 2012 ME 108, ¶ 27, 49 A.3d at 1289–90. 
 71. Id. 
 72. 2012 ME 108, ¶ 3, 49 A.3d at 1283. 
 73. 2012 ME 108, ¶ 4, 49 A.3d at 1283. 
 74. Id., 49 A.3d at 1283–84. 
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into entering the agreement.75 The court granted summary judgment 
in favor of Defendants, and Plaintiffs appealed.76 
The Supreme Court of Maine affirmed summary judgment for 
Defendants after evaluating the agreement under the factors test 
listed above.77 The court made the following statements regarding 
each factor: 
The summary judgment record demonstrates the following: the 
language of the disclaimer was clear; there is no pending 
allegation or proof of fraud that falls outside the scope of that 
disclaimer; Barr and Warren were businessmen who were 
familiar with the company and obtained or had the opportunity 
to obtain their own independent evaluation of the value of the 
stock; all parties were represented by counsel; the settlement’s 
terms were negotiated at arm’s length; and by the time the 
parties settled the pending lawsuit, there was no relationship of 
trust between the parties notwithstanding the preexisting 
fiduciary duties of the officers and directors.78 
Here the court enforced the integration clause in part based on 
the status of the parties, noting that the parties were businesspeople 
with knowledge of the company.79 Through this, the court showed 
that this was not a commercial contract of adhesion or an agreement 
in which “rigid enforcement of disclaimer-of-reliance clauses . . . 
may be inappropriate.”80 Instead, the court emphasized that in 
agreements between more knowledgeable and experienced parties 
like the businessmen in Barr, failing to enforce contracts’ integration 
clauses will “ ‘grievously impair[]’ freedom of contract.”81 This 
language is a good example of how a Court weighs one of these 
factors and considers it in the greater context of contracts principles. 
While none of the factors listed above are dispositive,82 each of 
them—like in the above analysis—may provide a court the avenue for 
considering the effect that enforcement of agreements may have on 
contracts law. 
Other courts have employed similar approaches using factor 
tests. For example, New York courts use a three factor test to 
 
 75. 2012 ME 108, ¶ 6, 49 A.3d at 1284. 
 76. 2012 ME 108, ¶ 10–11, 49 A.3d. at 1285. 
 77. 2012 ME 108, ¶ 33, 49 A.3d at 1291. 
 78. 2012 ME 108, ¶ 29, 49 A.3d at 1290. 
 79. Id. 
 80. 2012 ME 108, ¶ 18, 49 A.3d at 1287. 
 81. 2012 ME 108, ¶ 24, 49 A.3d at 1288 (quoting Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 
S.W.3d 51, 61 (Tex. 2008) (alterations in original)). 
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determine whether to enforce an integration clause that includes: “(1) 
whether the complaining party was a corporation and was advised by 
counsel; (2) whether the complaining party knew that existing 
information had not been provided as of the time of settlement; and 
(3) whether fraud separate from the fraud settled through the release 
can be established.”83 Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court has also 
applied a factor test when evaluating the enforceability of contractual 
disclaimers.84 While these individual factor tests may not use the exact 
factors that should be applied in North Carolina, they are good 
examples of functional approaches employed in other jurisdictions. 
Using a factor test gives courts flexibility when making decisions 
regarding whether or not to enforce an integration clause that 
prevents a fraud claim. However, a factor test can also have negative 
consequences by compromising predictability in courts’ decision-
making as compared to a bright-line rule. Any factor test will provide 
a nuanced approach to the enforceability of agreements, which can 
hamper parties’ ability to predict how a court may rule. Predictability 
is an important concern for the North Carolina Business Court, as the 
current problem is the lack of consistency and predictability under 
Wedderburn and Vestlyn. Easily identifiable factors could create more 
predictability compared to other factor tests by allowing for 
transparency and providing parties to a contract with a road map for 
how the court will make its decision. Additionally, assigning 
particular levels of weight to each factor or reducing the number of 
factors would help to quell concerns that a factor test would create 
more unpredictability.85 Ultimately, a factor test, while sacrificing a 
bit in predictability, would provide a better alternative to the current 
problems caused by the Wedderburn and Vestlyn lineages.86 
B. Boilerplate Contractual Provisions 
In addition to a factor test, North Carolina law suggests that 
there may be a way for the legislature to develop certain contractual 
 
 83. 2012 ME 108, ¶ 23, 49 A.3d at 1288 (citing Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. 
América Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V., 952 N.E.2d 995, 1001–03 (N.Y. 2011)). 
 84. See Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51, 61 (Tex. 2008) (citing 
Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1997)). 
 85. See Joseph P. Liu, Two-Factor Fair Use?, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 571, 579 (2008) 
(arguing that an advantage to using a factor test with only two factors is a greater ability to 
determine the weight and strength of the factors individually). 
 86. Sheri P. Adler, Note, Alternative Litigation Finance and the Usury Challenge: A 
Multi-Factor Approach, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 329, 356–57 (arguing that a factors test is 
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provisions that can serve as complete defenses to fraud claims. In the 
context of business contracts, the legislature has taken steps to control 
the enforceability of attorney’s fee claims, including when they are 
enforceable and exactly how they must be signed.87 Based on the 
legislature’s existing willingness to control certain parts of contract 
drafting, the legislature could pass statutes with boilerplate 
contractual provisions and instruct that they serve as complete 
defenses to fraud claims. For example, one of the provisions may 
appear as such: “I hereby waive any reliance on any representation 
that was made outside of the contract. The entire agreement is 
contained in the express language of this written agreement. By 
signing this agreement, I am waiving my right to pursue a fraud claim 
based on this agreement.” While this language may not be what the 
legislature would adopt, it expresses the general aim of these 
provisions: to put parties on notice that once the agreement is signed, 
extra-contractual fraud is no longer a viable legal claim. 
However, this approach may give rise to many of the same issues 
that exist under the current system. One concern is the type of 
pressure it puts on contract drafters to create provisions that courts 
will actually enforce. For example, some courts may only enforce 
non-reliance disclaimers when they are specific enough.88 The 
solution to this problem would be, as stated above, to have the 
legislature adopt exact language that when put into a contract would 
completely prevent a fraud claim. However, this would lead to 
another concern regarding how to protect less experienced consumers 
when these types of provisions are in play. For example, a party with 
no understanding of contract language may not understand the 
consequences of signing a contract with this type of provision, and 
then that party would have no remedy if there was genuine fraud in 
the transaction. A possible solution to this issue would be to only 
allow these fraud defense provisions to be effective under certain 
conditions.89 This would allow waivers of reliance to be utilized only 
when the parties are operating in a context appropriate for that level 
of contract enforcement, such as when the parties are more 
sophisticated or experienced contract drafters. The definitions of 
“business contract” and “consumer contract” already contained in 
North Carolina law may provide helpful guidance for establishing 
 
 87. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.6 (2015). 
 88. See Caiolo v. Citibank, N.A., New York, 295 F.3d 312, 330 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 89. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.6(a)–(e) (2015) (establishing defined categories of 
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where enforcing waivers of reliance is appropriate.90 If the legislature 
were to limit the enforceability of waiver of reliance provisions to 
“business contracts,” that could ensure less sophisticated parties 
would not be without recourse if they were defrauded in a consumer 
transaction. 
While both of these solutions are adoptable together, either one 
would aid North Carolina in taking a positive step from the current 
problem. Both the factor test and the boilerplate contract provision 
are alternatives to the current Wedderburn/Vestlyn dichotomy that 
would give contract drafters a clearer understanding of what will be 
enforced by the courts. Implementing either of these solutions would 
increase the predictability and consistency in North Carolina courts’ 
application of integration clauses to fraud claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The differing lineages of Wedderburn and Vestlyn illustrate an 
unclear conflict in North Carolina contract law. Businesses and 
practitioners have little reason to feel confident that their express 
written agreements will have any force when combating claims for 
fraud, even when the agreements contain waivers of reliance. 
However, there may be a way to resolve this conflict and adopt a 
more comprehensive standard that allows courts to be flexible in how 
they analyze fraud claims. North Carolina needs a balance between 
honoring the power of express agreements and protecting 
inexperienced consumers. Through the adoption of a factor test or 
statutory boilerplate contractual provisions, North Carolina might be 
able to chart a more predictable standard for businesses and 
practitioners. 
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